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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
VS. 
ONE (1) 1983 PONTIAC, 
(JOE ARAVE), 
Defendant-Respondent. 
i Case No. 20575 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant appeals from a decision of the District Court, 
in and for Cache County, State of Utah, which denied forfeiture. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Was Joe Arave the owner of the 1983 Pontiac in question 
and using said vehicle for the mere possession of cocaine and/or 
the distribution of cocaine? 
• 2. Does the amount of cocaine have any bearing on Utah 
Code Annotated Section 58-37-13 (1953 as amended)? 
3. Does Zions First National Bank of Utah, and/or the 
father of Joe Arave, have an equitable interest in said vehicle 
that would prevent forfeiture of the vehicle? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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4. Should the value of said vehicle have any effect on 
the State's ability to have the vehicle forfeited under Utah 
Code Annotated Section 58-37-13 (1953 as amended)? 
5. Did the Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen abuse his discretion 
in failing to forfeit said vehicle based upon his interpretation 
of the forfeiture Statute, Utah Code Annotated Section 58-37-13 
(1953 as amended)? 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower Court heard argument on a Petition by the State 
of Utah for forfeiture of a 1983 Pontiac pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated 58-37-13 (1953 as amended). In a Memorandum Decision 
dated the 14th day of February, 1985, the District Judge, the 
Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen, ruled that the vehicle should 
not be forfeited. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the lower Court ruling and 
the imposition of judgment declaring the vehicle forfeited. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about August 24, 1984, and on or about September 
13, 1984, Joe Arave was involved in the distribution of a controlled 
substance, to-wit: cocaine. Scott Crawford and Fred Olsen 
acted as undercover narcotic agents. 
On or about August 24, 1984, Joe Arave sold a half a gram 
of cocaine to an undercover officer. The controlled substance 
was transported to the undercover officer's residence on August 
25, 1984. The transportation was accomplished by One (1) 1983 
Pontiac owned by Joe Arave. 
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On or about September 13, 1984, Joe Arave was approached 
by undercover agents concerning the distribution of cocaine. 
Joe Arave went to his vehicle and produced a gram of cocaine 
from the interior of the One (1) 1983 Pontiac. The sale was 
not consummated at this time. Later in the evening on the same 
date, Joe Arave arrived at the under cover officer's residence 
and produced approximately one gram of cocaine that was transported 
within the One (1) 1983 Pontiac for final distribution. 
Joe Arave received $50.00 on August 24, 1984, for the purchase 
of cocaine, and $75.00 on September 13, 1984, for additional 
cocaine. 
The legal owner and title holder of the One (1) 1983 Pontiac 
is Joe Arave. The vehicle's owner owns an auto repair business 
known as "J.C.'s Paint and Body Work" which rebuilds and sells 
cars. The automobiles that were purchased for repair were usually 
financed by Zions First National Bank. The Bank, however, 
did not take a security interest in the 1983 Pontiac, nor do 
they claim an interest therein. Joe Aravefs father made a down 
payment of NINETEEN HUNDRED DOLLARS ($1,900.00) when the car 
was first purchased for repair. The vehicle in question is 
worth approximately TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($10,000.00). 
The Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen entered his Memorandum 
Decision on the 14th day of February, 1985, ruling against the 
State, and not allowing forfeiture of the Defendant vehicle. 
On the 22nd day of February, 1985, further hearings were held 
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dealing with procedural problems that might arise during the 
appeal period if the vehicle were returned to the owner. 
The Appellant relies upon Section 58-37-13, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953 as amended) for forfeiture of said vehicle because the 
vehicle facilitated the transportation of a controlled substance 
known as cocaine on two occasions. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The lower court abused its discretion in its interpretation 
of facts pertaining to cocaine distribution v. possession. 
The lower courts interpretation of Utah Code Annotated Section 
58-37-13 (1953 as amended) held the amount and value of the 
cocaine dictated whether forfeiture of a vehicle is permissible. 
The lower court relied upon proposed equitable interest in the 
defendant vehicle that do not exist. The value of the vehicle 
in question was determined by the lower court to have a bearing 
on the forfeiture statute. That the court misinterpretated 
Utah Code Annotated Section 58-37-13 (1953 as amended); a statute 
that is clear on its face. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WAS JOE ARAVE THE OWNER OF THE 
1983 PONTIAC IN QUESTION AND USING 
SAID VEHICLE FOR THE MERE POSSESSION 
OF COCAINE AND/OR FOR THE DISTRIBUTION 
OF COCAINE. 
The trial on the merits of Case No. 2341 was held on the 
8th day of February, 1985. Starting with page 16, line 25, 
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on the Reporter's transcript, testimony of Scott Crawford's 
conversation between Joe Arave and Fred Olson on the evening 
of August 24, 1984, was: "When he was leaving, Mr. Olsen asked 
him where he was going, and he said he was going to get some 
coke and asked if he wanted any, and Mr. Olsen said we did, 
and I asked him if it was $50.00 for a half a gram. Mr. Arave 
said it was, so I gave him the $50.00 and he left." At 2:30 
a.m. on the 25th of August, Joe Arave came back to Scott Crawford 
residence and gave Scott a bindle of cocaine. 
On September 13, 1984, at DeLorean's Manufacturing, Scott 
Crawford and Fred Olsen once again came in contact with Joe 
Arave. At this time Fred Olsen asked if Joe Arave could obtain 
an eight ball of cocaine. Joe Arave responded that he didn't 
have an eight ball at this time, but he could possibly get one 
next week. Joe Arave then stated that he had a gram of cocaine 
but would try to obtain another gram and come over to the officer 
house. (Reporter's Transcript, page 25, start with line 1). 
The officers anticipated receiving more than a gram of 
cocaine. (Reporter's Transcript, page 20, line 24). At approxi-
mately 6:30 p.m., Joe Arave delivered one gram of cocaine to 
the officers' residence, and the officers paid Joe Arave $75.00. 
(Reporter's Transcript, page 21, starting with line 17 through 
page 22). 
The State filed criminal charges, two counts, under Utah 
Code Annotated Section 58-37-8.(1) (a) (ii) (1953 as amended) which 
provides: 
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"(a) Except as authorized by this act, it 
shall be unlawful for any person knowingly 
and intentionally:" 
"(ii) to distribute for value a controlled 
or counterfeit substance:" 
Cocaine is a schedule II controlled substance. 
In State v. Taylor, (1979) 599 P.2d 496 at 498 and 499, 
the Defendant was charged with the crime of distributing a controlled 
substance for value. On October 4, 1977, Stubbs, working as 
an undercover agent, asked the Defendant to get her two bags 
of heroin, and the Defendant requested $5.00. Stubbs gave the 
Defendant the money and the Defendant, in return, gave Stubbs 
the controlled substance. A second offense for which the Defendant 
was convicted took place on October 10, 1977. Stubbs paid the 
Defendant $60.00 for two balloons of heroin. The main purpose 
for the State v. Taylor, Supra, to be before the Supreme Court 
was for the courts determination of entrapment. However, the 
facts also parallel those actions of Joe Arave and show the 
proper charge should be distribution, not merely possession. 
See also State vs. Kourbelas, (1980) 621, P.2d 1238 and 1239. 
It is very common for a distributer of cocaine to be a 
user as well. This is the case no matter where the distribution 
fits into the hierarchy of the distribution chain. Most Judges 
in a distribution case will also include a lesser included offense 
of possession in a jury instruction if reasonableness requires 
it. 
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The appellant submits that the facts before the Honorable 
Judge, as recited supra, indicate a proper charge of distribution 
for value. Such being the case, the forfeiture statute and 
case law is clear that drugs being transported for distribution 
purposes should result in having the vehicle so used being forfeited 
to the State. The lower court ruling of mere possession was 
erroneous in arriving at its determination of not forfeiting 
the vehicle and should be reversed. 
POINT II 
DOES THE AMOUNT OF COCAINE HAVE 
ANY BEARING ON UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
SECTION 58-37-13 (1953, AS AMENDED) 
In the case at hand the quantity of cocaine was one gram 
and a half. The only Utah case dealing with vehicle forfeiture 
is State v. One (1) Porsche 2-Door, (1974) 526 P.2d 917, 918 
and 921, where the Court was concerned with a small amount of 
marijuana and some other kind of pills; the exact amount is 
not expressly stated. The Supreme Court of Utah was not as 
concerned with the issue of quantity but rather that the Defendant 
was only charged with a Class B misdemeanor and that the fine 
did not compare with the enormity of a $10,000 vehicle value. 
In the present case, Joe Arave was charged with two third degree 
felonies, both having possible prison sentences and/or $5,000.00 
fines. 
The forfeiture statute itself does not contain any language 
requiring a certain quantity of drugs before forfeiture, nor 
does the statute contain any language that the charge must be 
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a felony before forfeiture becomes appropriate. The amount 
of drugs transported is irrelevant. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson 
Yacht (1974) 416 U.S. 663/ 40 L.Ed. 2d 452, U.S. v. One 1975 
Mercedes 280S, (1978) 590 F.2d 196, U.S. v. One 1975 Ford Pickup 
Truck, (1977) 558 F.2d 755 and the recent case of U.S. v. One 
(1) 1982 28' International Vessel, (1984) 741 F.2d 1319. 
Appellant respectfully submits that under case law and 
the Utah forfeiture statute (58-37-13 U.C.A. 1953 as amended), 
the quantity of the drug does not determine forfeiture. Such 
being the case, the lower court erred in reliance upon drug 
quantity in arriving at its determination of not forfeiting 
the vehicle. 
POINT III 
DOES ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK 
OF UTAH AND/OR THE FATHER OF JOE 
ARAVE HAVE AN EQUITABLE INTEREST 
IN SAID VEHICLE THAT WOULD PREVENT 
FORFEITURE OF THE VEHICLE. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 58-37-13 (l)(e)(iii) states: 
"Any forfeiture of a conveyance subject to 
a bona fide security to the interest of the 
secured party upon the party's showing he 
could not have known in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence that a violation would take place 
in the use of the conveyance." 
•;. • The Honorable Judge in his Memorandum Decision determined 
that Zions Bank had an equitable interest in Defendant vehicle. 
Joe Arave on direct . examination, (Page 30 of the Reporter's 
Transcript), stated that he secured FOUR THOUSAND DOLLARS ($4,000.00) 
for the purchase of the 1983 Pontiac, and TWENTY FIVE HUNDRED 
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DOLLARS ($2,500.00) for repairs. Zions Bank did not take a 
lien or a security interest in said vehicle (Page 31 of the 
Reporter's Transcript). Zions Bank had Joe Arave's father co-sign 
to give the bank security (Pages 44 and 48 of Reporter's Transcr-
ipt). Zions Bank does not claim a security interest in the 
1983 Pontiac. (Page 48 of the Reporter's Transcript). 
Joe Arave's father issued a check for NINETEEN HUNDRED 
DOLLARS ($1,900.00) for the down payment on the 1983 Pontiac. 
The reporter's transcript is void of any evidence that Joe Arave's 
Father was paid back or that Joe's father could have known "...in 
the exercise of reasonable diligence that a violation would 
take place in the use of the conveyance" involving the Pontiac 
in the use of cocaine distribution. (U.C.A. Section 58-37-13 
(l)(e)(iii)). 
Appellant respectfully submits that the lower court erred 
in finding that Zions Bank and Joe Arave's father had an equitable 
interest in the 1983 Pontiac. Assuming for arguendo purposes 
that an equitable interest is present, that interest could be 
compensated upon forfeiture of the vehicle. 
POINT IV 
SHOULD THE VALUE OF SAID VEHICLE 
HAVE ANY EFFECT ON THE STATE'S 
ABILITY TO HAVE THE VEHICLE FORFEITED 
UNDER UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 
58-37-13 (1953 AS AMENDED). 
In the Court's Memorandum Decision it was held that "the 
amount of forfeiture appears to be disproportionate to the use 
made of the vehicle." The Court further stated that it feels 
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"this is not a situation the legislature had in mind to discourage 
the illegal transportation of contraband." Value of the 1983 
Pontiac was estimated at TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($10,000.00). 
Appellant respectfully submits that the Statute is clear 
upon its face, and that the intent of the legislature would 
dictate the forfeiture of said vehicle based upon the facts. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 58-37-13 (1953 as amended) 
does not make any mandates as to value of the vehicle. The 
relevant portions of the code state: 
"(1) The following shall be subject to forfeiture 
and no property right shall exist in them: 
(a) All controlled substances which 
have been manufactured, distributed, dispensed 
or acquired in violation of this act; 
(b) All raw materials, products, and 
equipment of any kind used, or intended for 
use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing, 
delivering, importing, or exporting and controlled 
substance in violation of this act; 
(c) All property used or intended for 
use as a container for property described 
in subsections (l)(a) and (l)(b) of this 
section; 
(d) All conveyances including aircraft, 
vehicles of vessels used or intended for 
use, to transport, or in any manner facilitate 
the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, 
or concealment of property described in (l)(a) 
or (l)(b) of this section, except that: 
(i) No conveyance used by any 
person as a common carrier in the transaction 
of business as a common carrier shall be 
forfeited under this section unless it appears 
that the owner or other person in charge 
of the conveyance was a consenting party 
or privy to violation of this act; and 
-10-
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(ii) No conveyance shall be forfeited 
under this section by reason of any act or 
omission established by the owner to have 
been committed or omitted without his knowledge 
or consent; and 
(iii) Any forfeiture of a conveyance 
subject to a bona fide security interest 
shall be subject to the interest of the secured 
party upon the party's showing he could not 
have known in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence that a violation would take place 
in the use of the conveyance. 
(f) All books, records, and research, 
including formulas, microfilm, tapes, and 
data used or intended for use, in violation 
of this act." 
The Code is clear and not ambiguous. The legislature was 
not concerned with the value of the vehicle that is subject 
to forfeiture. If the vehicle participated in the transportation, 
sale, or possession of a controlled substance, the vehicle is 
subject to forfeiture. 
The facts before the lower court not only indicate possession 
of cocaine, but also trafficking of cocaine with the intent 
to distribute the same for value. 
Appellant respectfully submits that Utah Code Annotated 
Section 58-37-13 (1953 as amended) is clear upon its face, and 
that the lower court erred in taking the vehicle's value in 
considering whether forfeiture was proper. The intent of the 
legislature is clear, based upon the facts in the case at hand 
the 1983 Pontiac should be forfeited. 
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POINT V 
DID THE HONORABLE VENOY CHRISTOFFERSEN 
ABUSE HIS DISCRETION IN FAILING 
TO FORFEIT SAID VEHICLE BASED UPON 
HIS INTERPRETATION OF THE FORFEITURE 
STATUTE, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 
58-37-13 (1953 AS AMENDED)a 
In the drafting of U.C.A. Section 58-37-13 (1953 as amended) 
the legislature included certain exemptions for forfeiture. 
The exemptions in the forfeited section are found in Section 
58-37-13(1)(e)(i) through (iii). They read as follows: 
"(i) No conveyance used by any person 
business as a common carrier shall be forfeited 
under this section unless it appears that 
the owner or other person in charge of the 
conveyance was a consenting party or privy 
to violation of this act; and 
(ii) No conveyance shall be forfeited 
omission established by the owner to have 
been committed or omitted without his knowledge 
or consent; and 
(iii) Any forfeiture of a conveyance 
subject to a bona fide security interest 
shall be subject to the interest of the secured 
party upon the party's showing he could not 
have known in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence that a violation would take place 
in the use of the conveyance." 
The legislature has not included exceptions for quantity 
of the controlled substance transported, the value of the controlled 
substance in comparison with the worth of the vehicle, nor the 
value of the vehicle to be forfeited. The exemption in subsection 
(iii) supra only allows, after a showing of a bona fide security 
-12-
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interest has been shown by the secured party, that the party 
would be entitled to compensation. It would not prevent forfeiture. 
In the case of State v. Chambers, (1975) 533 P.2d 876 at 
879, the Supreme Court held that "if discretion is reasonably 
used, and is not shown to have been abused, arbitrary, or capricious, 
the judgment of the trial court should not be disturbed." The 
facts and the applicable statute in the present case clearly 
indicate that the 1983 Pontiac should have been forfeited. 
When the court takes it upon itself to add exceptions to a statute 
that is clear upon its face, and make findings inconsistent 
with the facts then it is acting in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner. The standards and/or elements become so arbitrary that 
a reasonable person is unable to make a determination whether 
forfeiture is ever applicable. 
The appellant would submit that the Statute (58-37-13 U.C.A. 
1953 as amended) is plain and its meaning is clear. The Utah 
Supreme Court held in In re Stevens Estate, (1942) 130 P.2d 
85 at 86 and 87 that: 
"This court will not read into this statute 
by judicial legislation the words 'or has 
some interest, direct or indirect.1 The 
language of the statute is plain and its 
meaning is clear, in which case there is 
no occasion to search for its meaning beyond 
the statute itself." 
Jurisdictions with statutes similar to Utah Code Annotated 
Section 58-37-13 (1953 as amended) would have held in similar 
fact situations that the vehicle should have been forfeited. 
-13-
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Only a small number of states allow forfeiture for mere possession. 
See Matter of 1972 Chevrolet Monte Carlo, (1977) 573 P.2d 535, 
State v. One Certain Conveyance, (1973) 211 N.W.2d 297 and 
State v. One 1970 2-Door Sedan Rambler (Gremlin), (1974) 215 
N.W. 2d 849. Virtually all states, however, allow forfeiture 
for distribution when the act results in a felony charge and/or 
a possible fine of up to $5,000.00. In the present case Joe 
Arave is charged with three felony distribution charges, two 
of which deal with the 1983 Pontiac directly. 
In the matter of One 1965 Ford Econoline Van v. State, 
(1979) 591 P.2d 569 at 572, the Arizona Supreme Court cited 
One Porsche 2-Door, supra, at 919, and that the Utah Supreme 
Court intended that the forfeiture statute did not apply to 
possession, but was "directed exclusively toward the transportation 
of a controlled substance for distribution according to erstwhile 
law merchant principles, and not for personal possession and 
consumption." The facts before the Court clearly indicate distri-
bution for value, and clearly fall within the legislative intent 
of the Utah Statute (U.C.A. Section 58-37-13, 1953 as amended). 
In light of the above reasoning, appellant respectfully 
submits that the lower court abused its discretion in its inter-
pretation of the facts and how the facts should apply to U.C.A. 
Section 58-37-13 (1953 as amended). And that the Court misconstrued 
legislative intent in its interpretation of a statute clear 
on its face. 
-14-
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully submits that Utah Code Annotated 
Section 58-37-13 (1953 as amended) is clear upon its face, and 
that the court abused its discretion in failing to forfeit the 
1983 Pontiac. For this reason, and the others heretofore presented/ 
appellant respectfully requests that the Utah Supreme Court 
reverse the judgment of the lower court and declare the vehicle 
in question forfeited. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. 
^2a,A^ JEFJ 
DepuJfctf] O&che County A t t o r n e y 
fb rn f tuk A t t o r n e y Gene ra l of t h e 
Staft£/of Utah 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
State of Utah 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to John T. Caine, 
Attorney for Defendant, at 2568 Washington Boulevard, Ogden, 
Utah, 84401. 
JUN 7W* 
"R" BURBANK 
ache County Attorney 
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^h 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
v. 
1983 PONTIAC, 
Defendant 
) 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
) Civil No. 23241 
* v 
The State has filed their complaint alleging the 1983 Pontiac 
was used in the transportation of controlled substance and 
therefore should be forfeited to the State. The 19 83 Pontiac 
Firebird had a value of approximately $10,000.00. It sometimes 
seems a little bit odd, that generally the cars* involved as far 
as the State seeking a forfeiture, involve $10,000.00 Pontiacs 
or Porsches, or $15,000.00 Transams, but no $250.00 1970 Chevs. 
In this case, there are four issues raised. One is jurisdiction 
since this matter was not set for trial as prescribed by 5 8-36-13 
(g). This provides where an answer to a complaint is filed* the 
Court shall set the matter for hearing within 20 days* This was 
not accomplished. This may be jurisdictional, the Court does not 
hold so since the Court must have some control over its own calendar 
and this may be an impossibility. But, even so, it is a noncompliance 
with that paragraph. 
The car was used to transport on one occasion a gram of cocaine. 
The defendant states he was going to get some for his own use and 
ask what turned out to be an undercover agent, if he wanted him to 
bring him some back to. The undercover agent said yes. This was Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
accomplished and at a later time the undercover agent approached 
the owner of the defendant vehicle and asked him to drop off 
another gram. This he did. There is no indication there was 
any profit motive in any cf the transportation of contraband 
that no doubt was in the possession of the owner of the Pontiac. 
It is questionable whether it was for sale/.but merely possession 
of his own and possession to turn it over to'who he thought was 
his friend. Technically, it appears there was a transportation. 
There is also a question of an equitable interest in the car 
by others than Mr. Arava, who is the defendant in the criminal 
aspect of this case. Since he has been in the business of buying car 
and fixing them for resale, and for the last two and one-half 
years has had an arrangement with Zion's Bank wherein they would 
loan him the money, on his Dad's guarantee, to buy the cars and 
sufficient monies to get the parts, repair them, so that he could 
re-sell them. True, they did not take in this case the registration 
or title as security, but this has been a procedure they have been 
following for the past two and one-half years with the bank 
furnishing the money for the purchse and repair of the vehicle. 
If the car is forfeited, the person who, under these circumstances, 
is penalized is not the defendant in the criminal case, but rather 
either his father or the bank. The amount of forfeiture appears 
to be disproportionate to the use made of the vehicle. 
Taking all four of these things into consideration, the 
jurisdiction, the use of the car, the equitable interest in the 
car by either the father or the bank since the loan was for 
$6,500.00, and looking at the auestion nf uhn ~~*-~ i.---* Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the Court feels that this is not a situation the legislature 
had in mind to discourage the illegal transportation of contraband. 
Therefore/ the Court dismiss1 the complaint of forfeiture by 
the State. The property to be returned back to the owner. 
Dated this /1<\ day of February,/1985. 
Istoffersen 
Judge 
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58-37-13 REGISTRATION DIVISION 
58-37-13. Property subject to forfeiture — Seizure — Procedure. (1) The 
following shall be subject to forfeiture and no property right shall exist in them: 
(a) All controlled substances which have been manufactured, distributed, dis-
pensed, or acquired in violation of this act; 
(b) All raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind used, or intended 
for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering, importing, or 
exporting any controlled substance in violation of this act; 
(c) All property used or intended for use as a container for property described 
in subsections (1) (a) and (1) (b) of this section; 
(d) All hypodermic needles, syringes, and other paraphernalia, not to include 
capsules used with health food supplements and herbs, used or intended for use 
to administer controlled substances in violation of this act; 
(e) All conveyances including aircraft, vehicles or vessels used or intended for 
use, to transport, or in any manner facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, pos-
session, or concealment of property described in (1) (a) or (1) (b) of this section, 
except that: 
(i) No conveyance used by any person as a common carrier in the transaction 
of business as a common carrier shall be forfeited under this section unless it 
appears that the owner or other person in charge of the conveyance was a consent-
ing party or privy to violation of this act; and 
(ii) No conveyance shall be forfeited under this section by reason of any act 
or omission established by the owner to have been committed or omitted without 
his knowledge or consent; and 
(iii) Any forfeiture of a conveyance subject to a bona fide security interest shall 
be subject to the interest of the secured party upon the party's showing he could 
not have known in the exercise of reasonable diligence that a violation would take 
place in the use of the conveyance. 
(f) All books, records, and research, including formulas, microfilm, tapes, and 
data used or intended for use, in violation of this act. 
(g) Everything of value furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange for 
a controlled substance in violation of this act, all proceeds traceable to such an 
exchange, and all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended 
to be used to facilitate any violation of this act; however, no property shall be for-
feited under this subsection, to the extent of the interest of the owner, by reason 
of any act or omission established by him to have been committed, or omitted with-
out his knowledge or consent. There is a rebuttable presumption that all money, 
coins, and currency found in close proximity to forfeitable controlled substances, 
drug manufacturing or distributing paraphernalia, or to forfeitable records of the^ 
importation, manufacture, or distribution of controlled substances are forfeitable 
under this section. The burden of proof shall be upon claimants of the property 
to rebut this presumption. 
(h) Ail imitation controlled substances as defined in the Imitation Controlled 
Substances Act. 
(2) Any property subject to forfeiture under this act may be seized by any peace 
officer of this state upon process issued by any court having jurisdiction over the 
property. However, seizure without process may be made when: 
(a) The seizure is incident to an arrest or search under a search warrant or 
an inspection under an administrative inspection warrant; 
(b) The property subject to seizure has been the subject of a prior judgment 
in favor of the state in a criminal injunction or forfeiture proceeding under this 
act; 
(c) The peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property is directly 
or indirectly dangerous to health or safety; or 
(d) The peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property has been 
used or intended to be used in violation of this act. 
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CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 58-37-13 
(3) In the event of seizure pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, proceedings 
under subsection (4) of this section shall be instituted promptly. 
(4) Property taken or detained under this section shall not be repleviable but 
shall be deemed to be in custody of the law enforcement agency making the seizure 
subject only to the orders and decrees of the court or the official having jurisdic-
tion. Whenever property is seized under the provisions of this act the appropriate 
person or agency may: 
(a) Place the property under seal; 
(b) Remove the property to a place designated by it or the warrant under which 
it was seized; 
(c) Take custody of the property and remove it to an appropriate location for 
disposition in accordance with law. 
(5) All substances listed in schedule I that are possessed, transferred, distrib-
uted, or offered for distribution in violation of this act shall be deemed contraband 
and seized and summarily forfeited to the state. Similarly, all substances listed 
in schedule I which are seized or come into the possession of the state shall be 
deemed contraband and summarily forfeited to the state if the owners are 
unknown. 
(6) All species of plants from which controlled substances in schedules I and 
II are derived which have been planted or cultivated in violation of this act, or 
of which the owners or cultivators are unknown, or are wild growths, may be seized 
and summarily forfeited to the state. 
(7) Failure, upon demand by the department or its duly authorized agent, of 
any person in occupancy or in control of land or premises upon which species of 
plants are growing or being stored, to produce an appropriate license or proof that 
he is the holder of a license, shall constitute authority for the seizure and forfeiture 
of the plants. 
(8) Whenever any property, including motor vehicles and other conveyances, is 
forfeited pursuant to this act by a finding of the court that no person is entitled 
to recover such property, the property, if a motor vehicle or other conveyance, shall 
be deposited in the custody of the department of finance. Property other than motor 
vehicles and conveyances shall be deposited with the department. Disposition of 
all property shail be as follows: 
(a) Any state agency, bureau, county, or municipality, which demonstrates a 
need for specific property or classes of property subject to forfeiture shall make 
application for such property to the director of the department of finance, in cases 
involving motor vehicles and conveyances, or the department, in cases of other 
property, and shall clearly set forth in the application his or its need for the prop-
erty and the use to which the property will be put. 
(b) The director of the department of finance or business regulation shall review 
all applications for property submitted pursuant to subsection (8) (a) of this section 
and make a determination based on necessity and advisability as to final disposition 
and shall so notify the designated applicant who may obtain the property upon 
payment of all costs to the appropriate department. The department of finance or 
business regulation shall in turn reimburse the seizing agency or agencies for costs 
expended in seizing, storing, and obtaining forfeiture of said property. 
(c) If no disposition is made upon an application under subsection (8) (a) of this 
section, the director of the department of finance or business regulation shall dis-
pose of the property by public bidding or where deemed appropriate by the director 
of the department having charge of the property, by destruction. Proof of destruc-
tion shall be upon oath of two officers or employees of the department having 
charge of the property verified by the director of the department or his designated 
agent. 
(9) Whenever any property is subject to forfeiture, a determination for forfei-
ture to the state shall be made in the following manner: 
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58-37-13 REGISTRATION DIVISION 
(a) A complaint verified on oath or affirmation shall be prepared by the county 
attorney where the property was seized or is to be seized and filed in the district 
court. The complaint shall describe with reasonable particularity: 
(i) The property which is the subject matter of the proceeding; 
(ii) The date and place of seizure, if known; 
(iii) The allegations which constitute a basis for forfeiture. 
(b) Upon filing the complaint, the clerk of the district court shall forthwith 
issue a warrant for seizure of the property which is the subject matter of the action 
and deliver it to the sheriff for service, unless the property has previously been 
seized without a warrant, pursuant to section 58-37-13(2). 
(c) Notice of the seizure and intended forfeiture shall be filed with the county 
clerk, and served together with a copy of the complaint, upon all persons known 
to the county attorney to have a claim in the property by one of the following 
methods: 
(i) Upon each claimant whose name and address is known at the last known 
address of the claimant; or 
(ii) Upon each owner whose right, title or interest is of record in the motor 
vehicle division, by mailing a copy of the notice and complaint by registered mail 
to the address given upon the records of the motor vehicle division; and 
(iii) Upon all other claimants whose addresses are unknown, but who are 
believed to have an interest in the property, by one publication in a newspaper 
of general circulation in the county where the seizure was made. 
(d) Except as provided in subsection (8) (e) of this section any claimant or inter-
ested party shall file with the court a verified answer to the complaint within 
twenty days after service has been obtained. 
(e) Whenever property is seized pursuant to this act, any interested person or 
claimant of the property, prior to being served with a complaint under this section, 
may file a petition in the district court for release of his interest in the property. 
The petition shall specify the claimant's interest in the property and his right to 
have it released. A copy shall be served upon the county attorney in the county 
of the seizure who shall answer the petition within twenty days. Any person peti-
tioning shall not be required to answer a complaint of forfeiture. 
(f) After twenty days following service of a complaint or petition for release, 
the court shall examine the record and if no answer is on file, the court shall allow 
the complainant or petitioner an opportunity to present evidence in support of his 
claim and order forfeiture or release of the property as the court may determine. 
If the county attorney has not filed an answer to a petition for release and the 
court determines from the evidence that the petitioner is not entitled to recovery 
of the property it shall enter an order directing the county attorney to answer the 
petition writhin ten days, and if no answer is filed within that period, the court 
shall order the release of the property to the petitioner entitled to receive it. 
(g) Whenever an answer to a complaint or petition appears of record at the 
end of twenty days, the court shall set the matter for hearing within twenty uays 
at which all interested parties may present evidence of their right of release of 
the property following the state's evidence for forfeiture. The court shall determine 
by a preponderance of the evidence the issues in the case and order forfeiture or 
release of the property as it shall determine. 
(h) Proceedings of this section shall be independent of any other proceedings, 
-whether civil or criminal, under this act or the laws of this state. 
(i) Whenever the court determines that claimants have no right in the property 
in whole or in part, it shall declare the property to be forfeited and direct it to 
be delivered to the custody of the department of finance, in cases involving motor 
vehicles or conveyances, or to the department of business regulation in other cases, 
and such department shall dispose of the property as provided in subsection (8) 
of this section. 
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DRUG PARAPHERNALIA 58-37a-2 
(j) Whenever the court determines that property, in whole or in part, is not 
subject to forfeiture, it shall order release of the property to the proper claimant. 
If the court determines that the property is subject to forfeiture and release in 
part, it shall order partial release and partial forfeiture. When the property cannot 
be properly divided for partial forfeiture and release, the court shall order it sold 
and the proceeds distributed as follows: 
(i) First, proportionally among the legitimate claimants; 
(ii) Second, to defray the costs of the action, including seizure, storage of the 
property, and costs of sale, and 
(iii) Third, to the department of finance for the state general fund. 
(k) In any proceeding under this section where forfeiture is declared, in whole 
or in part, the court shall assess all costs of the forfeiture proceeding, including 
seizure and storage of the property, against the individual or individuals whose 
conduct was the basis of the forfeiture, and may assess costs against any other 
claimant or claimants to the property as the court deems just. 
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, § 13; 1982, ch. sumption, forfeiture provision of subd. (l-)(e) 
12, § 2; 1982, ch. 32, § 9. did not apply to student arrested for driving 
j~
 : l , V A , „ under influence of alcohol who was found in 
Compiler s Notes. • * c en. . 
m. ,nn„ . , , , . possession of one ounce of marijuana. State 
The 1982 amendment by chapter 12
 v Q n e P o r s c h e 2_Door% L D N o 9 1 1 2 1 1 0 2 6 f 
inserted subd. (l}(g)
 T i U e N o p p 1 ( ) 0 2 6 F B e a r i K a n s a g L i c e n g e 
Tne 1982 amendment by chapter 32 p i a t e No. JOR 1652(1974)526 P 2d 917. inserted subd. (l)(h). 
Purpose of statute. L a w Reviews, 
Since primary purpose of statute is preven- Comment, State v. One (1) Porsche 2-Door: 
tion of transportation of controlled sub- A Judicial Standard for Forfeiture of Con-
stances to accomplish possession, and not veyances for Simple Possession of Marijuana, 
prevention of personal possession and con- 1974 Utah L. Rev. 871. 
CHAPTER 37a 
DRUG PARAPHERNALIA 
Section 
58-37a-l. Short title. 
58-37a-2. Purpose. 
58-37a-3. "Drug paraphernalia" defined. 
58-37a-4. Considerations in determining whether object is drug paraphernalia. 
58-37a-5. J^JaJK&l-ftets. 
58-37a-6. Seizure — Forfeiture — Property rights. 
58-37a-l.' Short title. This chapte r shall be known and may be cited as the 
"Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act." 
History: L. 1981, ch. 76, § 1. phernalia; providing for civil and criminal 
penalties; and providing an-effective date. — 
Laws 1981, ch. 76. Title of Act. 
An act relating to controlled substances 
providing that it is unlawful to use, possess ^ a w R e v j e w s # 
with intent to use, or deliver any drug pai*a- * . ^
 1 / i r w r , 
phernalia; providing guidelines for determin- ktah Legislative Survey - i981, I9a2 Utah 
ing whether a particular object is drug para- L. Rev. 125, 149. 
58-37a-2. Purpose. It is the intent of this chapter to discourage the use of nar-
cotics by eliminating paraphernalia designed for processing, ingesting, or otherwise 
using a controlled substance. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 76, § 2. 
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STATE v. ONE PORSCHE 2-DR., I.D. N(). 9 
Cite a* 52( 
The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
ONE (I) PORSCHE 2-DOOR, I.D. NO. 
911211026, TITLE NO. PPI0026F BEAR-
ING KANSAS LICENSE PLATE NO. 
JOR 1652, Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 13495. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sopt. IS, 1^74. 
Appeal by State from denial by the 
Seventh District Court, Grand County, Ed-
ward Sheya, J„ of petition for forfeiture 
of automobile which was seized when its 
owner was arrested for possession of one 
ounce of marijuana. The Supreme Court, 
Henriod, JM held that forfeiture of auto-
mobile could not be accomplished under 
statute providing that all conveyances used 
or intended for use to transport, or in any 
manner facilitate the transportation, sale, 
receipt, possession, or concealment of all 
controlled substances in violation of the 
Controlled Substances Act, are forfeitable, 
in that the statute pertains to transporta-
tion to accomplish possession, not simply 
transportation "with" possession. 
Affirmed. 
Crockett, J., dissented with opinion in 
which EUctt, ].. concurred. 
1. Drugs and Narcotics C=> 181 
The primary and sole purpose of stat-
ute providing that all conveyances used or 
intended for use, to transport, or in any 
manner facilitate the transportation, sale, 
receipt, possession, or concealment of con-
trolled substances in violation of the Con-
trolled Substances Act are forfeitable was 
directed exclusively towards the trans-
portation of a controlled substance for dis-
tribution according to erstwhile law mer-
chant principles, and not for personal pos-
session and consumption. U.C.A.1953, 58-
37-13(l)(e) . 
2. Drugs and Narcotics C=> 191 
Automobile could not be forfeited un-
der statute providing that all conveyances 
1 -
.12110isb, T. PP10026F, ETC. Utah 917 
l \:d 1)17 
used or intended for use to transport or in 
any manner facilitate the transportation, 
sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of 
controlled substances in violation of the 
Controlled Substances Act, except if sub-
ject to a bona fide security interest, are 
forfeitable when its owner was arrested 
for possession of one ounce of marijuana 
in that forfeiture under the statute would 
have been unconscionable since the statute 
pertains to transportation to accomplish 
possession, not simply transportation 
"with" possession. U.C.A.1953, 58-37-
13(l)(e) . 
Vernon B. Rommey, Atty. Gen., M. Reid 
Russell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City," 
for plaintiff and appellant. 
Gerald 11. Kinghorn, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and respondent. 
'HENRIOD, Justice: 
One Price, owner of a Porsche automo-
bile, valued at ? 10,000, was stopped and ar-
rested for speeding, possession of a con-
trolled substance and driving while under 
the influence of alcohol. He was charged 
with possession. There is nothing in the 
record to indicate what disposition was 
made of that charge. 
Nonetheless, after the arrest and appar-
ently before the charge was filed, the car 
was turned over to the State for forfei-
ture. 
The section of the statute under which 
this forfeiture was accomplished, Title 58-
37-13(1 We), Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
either is invalid or inapplicable under the 
facts of this case for the following rea-
sons : 
The section mentioned reads as follows: 
(e) All conveyances including aircraft, 
vehicles or vessels used or intended foj 
use, to transport, or in any manner facil-
itate the transportation, sale, receipt, 
possession, or concealment of property 
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described in ( l ) ( a ) or (1)(b) of this 
section, except that: 
(iii) Any forfeiture of a conveyance 
subject to a bona fide security interest 
shall be subject to the interest of the 
secured party upon the party's showing 
he could not have known in the exer-
cise of reasonable diligence that a vio-
lation would take place in the use of 
the conveyance. 
I. The section, as applied to this case 
leads to an unusually harsh result, consti-
tutes an additional fine or penalty in con-
nection with a misdemeanor—that of pos-
session of marijuana. Jt is conceded that 
basis of the charge is that one ounce of 
marijuana was being carried by Price, who 
was a university student in Lawrence, 
Kansas. But it is undisputed that his sole 
purpose for being in Utah was to visit the 
Arches National Monument,—not to trans-
port a controlled substance. It appears 
that the thrust of the section mentioned 
above is to deter the transportation of a 
controlled substance from one place to an-
other and has nothing to do with a situa-
tion where the controlled substance,—one 
ounce of marijuana in this case,—simply in 
a car but possessed by a person incident to 
a vacation and only incident and collateral 
to transportation and obviously for person-
al consumption, is involved. It seems un-
thinkable that one would package up an 
ounce of marijuana for the primary pur-
pose of transporting it five hundred to a 
\. 46 Utah 307. 151 P. 353 (1015); Morgan 
v. Sorenson, 3 Ctah 2d 42.S, 2.S0 P.2d 22!) 
(1055); Sehletfel v. Iloiitfli. 1*2 Or. 441, 
1.S0 P.2d 51(1. 1S.S p.2d 15,S (1047); Miller 
v. Stuart, 00 Ctah 250, 253 P. 000 (1027). 
2. Title O.S-3-2, Ctah Coile Annotate! 1053, 
seems to be apropos under Hie facts of this 
rase. See also: Spoon-Shaeket v. County 
of Oakland, 350 Mich. 151. 07 X.\V.2d 25 
(1050); State v. Hunt, 13 I'tah 2d 32, 30S 
I\2d 201 (1002): Stanton v. Davis, 0 Cf,ih 
2d 1S4, 341 I\2d 207 (1050). 
3. "The decision of the trial court should he 
affirmed if it is correct, although 
(it) . . relied upon a wrong ground 
or gave a wrong reason." 5 Am.Jur.2d, Sec. 
thousand miles for sale, receipt, possession 
or concealment. 
This whole case leads to an unconsciona-
ble forfeiture, and that the trial court was 
correct in concluding that the enormity of 
the forfeiture hardly could fit the $299 
misdemeanor. 
That forfeitures are frowned upon needs 
citation of but few authorities since the 
cases supporting such an elementary prin-
ciple are legion. In Moran v. Knights of 
Columbus,1 our court had this to say as to 
forfeitures: 
It matters not . . . whether the 
action is one in equity or one at law; 
the rules of equity . . . must 
prevail/* 
It is no answer for appellant to urge 
that the court's interpretation of the stat-
ute was erroneous,—if the decision of the 
court is supported by good and sufficient 
reason or reasons.3 
II. The statute must be examined in the 
light of its purpose and/or intent of the 
legislature. 
In State Land Board v. State Depart-
ment of Fish and Game,4 we said: 
. . with respect to the meaning 
of statutes, it is appropriate to look to 
the intended purpose and to the means of 
accomplishing it by the proper applica-
tion of the language used. 
[1] It appears obvious that the primary 
and sole purpose of the statute and the in-
tent of the legislature were directed exclu-
7S5, p. 227. See also: Tree v. White, 110 
Utah 233, 171 P.2d 30S (1040); Ila-ue v. 
Xephi Jrr. Co., 10 Utah 421, 52 P. 705: 
Piper v. Kakle, 7S Ctah 342, 2 I\2d 0(>0 
(1031); Harris v. Putler. 01 Utah 11, 03 
l\2d 2S0 (1030); Limb \. Fed. Milk Prod. 
Ass'n, 23 Ctah 2d 222, 401 P.2d 200 (1000) ; 
In He Love's Estate, 75 I'tah 342, 2S5 P. 
200 (1030) ; Thomas v. Foultfcr, 71 Ctah 274, 
204 P. 075 (102S). 
4. 17 Ctah 2d 237, 4ON p.2d 707 (1005). See 
also: AiiilniH v. Allred, 17 Ctah 2d 100, 404 
P.2d 072 (1005); Snyder v. Chine. 15 Ctah 
2d 254. 300 I\2d 015 (1004) : Younjr v. Har-
ney, 20 Ctah 2d 10\ 433 P.2d 840-(1007). 
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sivcly toward the transportation of a con-
trolled substance for distribution according 
to erstwhile law merchant principles, and 
not for personal possession and consump-
tion. 
Let's look at the statute which points 
strictly to transportation, not mere posses-
sion. It says: "All cuwcyanccs [connot-
ing transportation] including aircraft, ve-
hicles or vessels [connoting transportation] 
used or intended for use, to transport [con-
noting transportation], or in any manner 
facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, 
possession, or concealment of property 
. except . . . " are forfeitable. 
[Emphasis added.] 
[2] The statute's theme song has lyrics 
that require the sheet music to be prefaced 
by a title such as "Transportation." It 
seems that the word "possession" men-
tioned in the section obviously must have 
an end result from asportation, the grava-
men of the legislation, as does the word 
"concealment." Grammatically, hardly 
could it be said that knowingly "posses-
sion" of an ounce of marijuana by the 
Captain on the deck of "Old Ironsides," in 
Boston Harbor, would subject that vessel 
to forfeiture if the venerable warrior were 
dry-docked there or in a harbor operated 
by a ship museum buff at Great Salt Lake. 
The statute is transportation to accomplish 
possession, not simply ' transportation 
"with" possession,—where the obvious pur-
pose of the statute is an interdiction 
against transportation for the accomplish-
ment of distribution throtigh pushers, 
pimps or pirates,—not to accomplish a for-
feiture because one has a marijuana ciga-
rette in his pocket or mouth, headed for 
Disneyland,—or Arches National Monu-
5. ^r^ \:u\\\ 101. -v.n I\LM 012 (RMK). 
6. State v. Salt Lake City Rd. of Ed., K* I t ah 
2d f>0, 'M\S P.2d 4US (1902) ; Crist v. Rishop. 
r t i ih . f>20 P.2d 100 (1074) ; Parker v. Hamp-
ton, 2* I'tnh 2d 30, 4i>7 P.2d K4N (1072) : 
Howe v. .Jackson. IS Vt<\\\ 2d 200. 421 P.2d 
150 (1000). 
7. Jolmnson v. Cudahy, 107 Ptah 114, 152 I \ 
2d O.S (1044), where we said: " . . . we 
are cognizant, of the fact that we are not 
H1211026, T< PP10026F, ETC. Utah 919 
(i P.2d 917 
mcnt. The Title in Chapter 145, page 475, 
Laws of Utah 1971, seems to bear me out 
on this conclusion, as do the authorities. 
In Masich v. U. S. Smelting5 we said: 
One of the cardinal principles of stat-
utory construction is that the courts will 
look to the reason, spirit, and sense of 
the legislation, as indicated by the entire 
context and subject matter of the statute 
dealing with the subject.0 
III. The statute obviously can lead to 
the most absurd results,—a reason this 
court consistently has pointed up as a valid 
reason for invalidation of a statute, or a 
refusal to apply it under particular facts 
making such application ridiculous.1 This 
case is such a case, and it is suggested that 
possession of an ounce of marijuana, the 
purpose of which is personal consumption, 
—with incidental transportation for such 
purpose,—is not trafficking in dope, which 
is the evil that the statute obviously is de-
signed to eliminate. Under the legislation, 
Trice would have to forfeit his $10,01)0 
Porsche if he happened to be sitting in it 
in his driveway in silence and serenity, 
smoking a marijuana cigarette, and was 
approached by a gendarme, who took his 
car out from under him. Under this stat-
ute he could have his car taken from him 
if he were taking his six-year old to school 
and happened to have a marijuana ciga-
rette in his pocket,—or under such circum-
stances he was rushing his pregnant wife 
to the hospital,—or if he were driving the 
Porsche out of a burning garage,—or 
trying to escape from a highwayman or a 
flood or anything else. All of these, if 
bases for forfeiture, in my opinion would 
give birth to a very serious constitutional 
question as to the statute's application 
following the literal wording of the .statute, 
hut such is not required when to do MO would 
defeat legislative intent ami make the stat-
ute absurd. In this regard see Robinson v. 
Union Pacific K. To., 70 Ptah 441, 201 P. 
0 ; Rrackett v. Chamberlain, 115 Me. fttf, OS 
A. WW; Nichols v. Logan, 1S4 Ky. 711, 213 
SAW i s l . " Masich v. P. S. Smelting, supra, 
footnote 5 ; Rowley v. Pub. Serv. Tomm., 112 
Vtah 110, ISO l\2d f>14 (11M7). 
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being" offensive to the due process clause 
or equal protection clause. 
IV. The exception to the statute de-
vours it. Section 13(l)(e) , Chapter 145, 
Laws of Utah 1971 (Title 5&-37-l3(l)(c) 
Utah Code Annotated 1953), has three 
sub-subsections: (i) excepts common car-
riers, (ii) owner having no knowledge of 
contraband in his ''conveyance," and (iii) 
excepts from forfeiture any such "convey-
ance" where the owner has a security in-
terest in it, and did not know of any un-
lawful use thereof. This section might be 
dubbed the "finance" or "bank" or "loan 
shark" section. This is the section that 
makes the statute silly and amounts to in-
verse discrimination,—-a discrimination in 
favor of a "mortgagee." Such a mortga-
gee and the conveyance are protected. Jt 
seems that if Price had borrowed a bona 
fide $8,000 from a bank or finance compa-
ny, the Porsche would not have been sub-
ject to forfeiture, Price could have re-
tained possession, gone to Arches National 
Monument, smoked marijuana all the way, 
returned to Lawrence, Kansas, gone back-
to school, unfettered, in his PorscheT and 
paid off the loan at his leisure or accord-
ing to the terms of his loan, ff he were 
driving a leased car, as thousands of peo-
ple do these days rather than to buy one, 
such conveyance could not be forfeited un-
der this statute. Neither would it be so 
subject if he rented a car from Hertz, or 
Avis, or U-1 laid. Neither would it be sub-
ject to forfeiture if he borrowed the car 
from his brother or wife, or if he stoic it, 
or temporarily converted it, or sold it the 
day he left Lawrence in exchange for a 
promissory note, with permission to drive 
to Utah. 
The most that can be said for this stat-
ute's efficacy or practical worth, much less 
its validity, was said in 1967, when the 
California legislature repealed its legisla-
tion on forfeiture of vehicles used in viola-
tion of narcotics laws. Jn California Stat-
utes 1967, Chapter 280, Section 1, page 
1437, "Urgency," the legislature had this to 
say : 
The Commission on California State 
Government Organization and Economy, 
in a report dated December 12, 1966, 
stated that the people of this state will 
save at least six hundred thousand dol-
lars ($600,000) each year if the motor 
vehicle forfeiture provisions of the 
Health and Safety Code are abolished. 
The report further stated that such pro-
visions have had No Deterrent Effect. 
In order to immediately effectuate the 
annual savings to the state of such a 
great sum of money, and in order to en-
able numerous personnel of the Bureau 
of Narcotic Enforcement to redirect 
their efforts toward the enforcement of 
laws which have real influence as deter-
rents to illegal narcotic activities, it is 
necessary that this act go into immediate 
effect. 
The moral of this story if- this case 
should be reversed would be interesting 
mostly and primarily to the pusher, and to 
him who makes a business of trafficking in 
and transporting contraband. It then 
would be simple: If you buy a car in 
which you want to transport marijuana for 
consume an ounce yourself on the way to 
the Arches), make sure the bank or loan 
company has your note and chattel mort-
gage, or just borrow a car. or lease one, or 
rent one, and you will have transportation 
throughout Utah free and clear of forfei-
ture and without any concern whatever 
that you will be prohibited either from 
owning or driving it. 
The trial court's judgment should be and 
is sustained. 
CALLISTER.C. J., and TUCKETT, J., 
concur. 
CROCKETT, Justice (dissenting). 
It is indisputably clear from the evidence 
that Donald Price, the owner of this-
Porsche sedan, was knowingly transporting 
in it considerable quantities of illicit drugs: 
marijuana and amphetamine pills; and 
that they were discovered and seized in 
connection with his lawful arrest. The 
Highway Patrol officers had followed this 
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car, clocking its speed at 9? to 100 miles 
per hour. The arresting officer, William 
Pcctol, testified that at the time of the ar-
rest he ohserved in the car in an open sack 
plastic hags containing what appeared to 
he marijuana; and also ohserved different 
kinds of pills. 
The amounts of these suhstances is not 
expressly stated. IUit it is clear that the 
one ounce of marijuana which was tested 
had no relationship whatsoever to the total 
quantities of illicit drills found in the car. 
Informative on this point are certain ex-
cerpts from the record. Officer Pcctol 
said that after lie had informed Mr. Price 
that he was under arrest and "read him his 
rights from the card" : 
O. What did you do then? 
A. 1 laid all the stuff containing con-
tents oi the sack on the hood of the pa-
trol car and asked him if he could identi-
fy it and asked him if the other two pas-
senders knew what was in the vehicle. 
And he stated no, that the marijuana 
was his, and / asked him if he could 
identify tlie pills and he said they are 
amphetamines. 
(). Xow from that teli me what you 
did in petting the samples? 
A. We dumped all of the contents on 
the desk in the patrol office. Took a 
sample of marijuana and placed it in a 
plastic hap and taped it up, placed it in-
side of the yellow envelope. Wrote on 
the sample 1, my case numher and what 
the sample was containing. Sealed that 
envelope, taped it and initialed it, ami we 
did this to each of the different colored 
pills. 
Q. That was sent in to the state, toxi-
cologist? 
A. Yes. 
Also pertinent to this point is a state-
ment of° the trial court with reference to 
the proffered evidence. In speaking of the 
officer's testimony he stated in part: 
he testified that there were a 
numher of plastic bags and I just can't 
52b P.2d—58Va 
assume that what is in that hag is mari-
juana . . . . 
* * * * . * * 
I mean / can infer from 
what you said / can make a reasonable 
inference, hut 1 don't think it is estab-
lished to the point that 1 can receive it 
in evidence as marijuana. Without hav-
ing been tested. When all he says is he 
suspects that it is. He took out some 
and they say that was marijuana, but 1 
don't feel warranted in making an as 
sumption to the point where I will admit 
it in evidence as marijuana upon merely 
his suspicion. 1 think 1 have got all of 
the mileage you can get out of it when 
he (Officer PeetoU says he took some 
out and proved to be marijuana and here 
is the report that is in evidence. 
O. As I recall, there were two plastic 
bags? 
A. Yes, I believe there were two. 
Concerning the matter of forfeiture in 
his memorandum decision the trial court 
referred to the car as being of great value, 
$10,000 which he regarded as greatly dis-
proportionate to the penalty for the crime. 
(The main opinion speaks of a fine of 
$209. Hut there is also the more important 
penalty of up to six months in jail ) 
Moreover, it is to be noted that Section 
3SU^7_S, U.C.A.l°o3, which provides for 
the penalties for the possession of marijua-
na, further provides in subsection 58-37-
S(S) : 
Any penalty imposed for violation cf 
this section shall be in addition to, and 
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative 
penalty or sanction authorized by law. 
The important proposition to be noted on 
this appeal is that the only reason given by 
the trial court for his refusal to declare 
the. forfeiture of the automobile was that 
he thought that its value (the only evidence 
concerning value was Price's statement 
that he had paid $10,0nn for it) was so dis-
proportionate to the penalty for the of-
fense of possession of marijuana that the 
forfeiture should not be enforced. In that 
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connection he s ta ted : ' T h i s court does not 
believe that the legislature intended such a 
harsh and dras t ic resu l t / ' i. e.f the forfei-
ture . 
The proposition stated by the trial j udge 
gives rise.to two t hough t s : 
First , that the judge jus t couldn't believe 
the legislature meant what is so clearly 
said in the s ta tutes . 
Second, that if a person is caught t rans -
por t ing drugs in an old beat-up inexpensive 
car, it is subject to forfeiture. But if he is 
more prosperous in his traff ic, and has a 
fine new expensive car, the law should not 
deign to forfeit it. 
T h e trial j udge was patently r ight when 
he said *'I can make a reasonable infer-
ence." Tha t is, that the rest of the sub-
stance was also mar i juana . It is totally in-
conceivable to me that the officer could 
pick' up one ounce of substance, all of 
which had the same appearance, which 
would turn otit to be mar i juana , and the 
rest of it be something else. J therefore 
say with complete assurance that the only 
reasonable inference was that the ent i re 
quant i ty was mar i juana . I add, however , 
that the issue of forfei ture under the stat-
ute, depends only upon the identification of 
some substantial and identifiable amount of 
mar i juana , and not upon any par t icular 
quant i ty thereof. 
It is to be remembered that the forfei-
ture of property declared by law is not the 
same as imposing a sentence for a cr ime, 
with respect to which the trial court does 
1. As to the grunt of general power to the 
courts to suspend sentences or grant proba-
tion in criminal cases see Sec. 77-35—17, I*. 
C.A.10."tf. 
2. Cases sustaining the principle of forfeiture 
as a means of law enforcement are numerous". 
K. g.. for similar cases of forfeiture see Asso-
ciated Investment Company v. United States, 
220 F.2d N.S5 (5th Cir. 1955); two smoked 
marijuana cigarettes in the vehicle resulted 
in forfeiture; (Jerieral Finance Corporation 
of Florida South v. United Status, XY.\ F.2d 
6X1 (5th Cir. 1004) :. State v. Meyers, 32N 
S.\V.2d .'321 (Tex.Civ.App.Ul5!)) ; Cunnichael 
Finance Company v. State, 175 S.\V.2d o*1i? 
(Tex.Civ.App.1071) ; I'rinee George's County 
have some discret ion in modifying or sus-
pending the sentence.1 T h e declara t ion of 
forfei ture of proper ty under c i rcumstances 
so jus t i fy ing is the manda te of the people, 
speaking th rough their legislature. W h e n 
such a manda te is expressed in clear and 
unambiguous terms, it is the duty of the 
court to abide thereby and ca r ry out its 
mandate , thus avoiding judicial in t rus ions 
into the legislative prerogat ive . 2 
T h e principle of forfei ture of the means 
of t ranspor ta t ion as a method of law en-
forcement and control of illicit t raf f ic in 
cont raband was discussed and reviewed by 
the United S ta tes Supreme Court in the re-
cent case of Calero-Toieclo v. Pea r son 
Yacht l e a s i n g Co.3 Tha t principle was 
reaff i rmed in a si tuation great ly more ex-
aggera ted than the instant one. Af te r of-
ficers had discovered mar i juana aboard , 
the yacht was seized and forfeited pursu-
ant to Puer to Rican statutes.4 T h e Su-
preme Cour t rejected the at tack upon the 
procedure and the s t a tu t e s ; and par t icu lar -
ly rejected the contention of deprivat ion of 
proper ty without due process of law under 
t!ie Four teenth Amendment . It is note-
wor thy that our Utah statute is more fair 
than . ilic. one under at tack in the• Calero-
Toledo case, in that under our s ta tute the 
owner is given the opportuni ty to show his 
innocence and his interest will be protect-
ed. 
Wi th respect to the California exper i -
ence referred to in the main opinion, this 
should be no t ed : their stature was not de-
v. One (I) 1000 Opel, et nl.. 207 Md. 401, 
208 A .2d 10X; State v. One 1007 Ford Mus-
tang, 200 Md. 275, 202 A.2d 04. S«M- discus-
sion in the latter rase wherein the Maryland 
Court of Appeals said, inter alia, that the 
refusal to -declare the forfeiture would be 
"comparable to refusal to enter a large judg-
ment against a debtor becausi* it would place 
a great burden upon the defendant. 
3. 410 U.S. 0(>;i, 04 S.Ct. 2080, 40 L.Ed.2d 4~>2 
(1074). 
4. Puerto Kico Laws Ann. Tit. 24, Section 
2512(a)(4), which has the same wording of 
the present Ctaii Statute, Section 5S-o7-b'> 
( l ) ( e ) , U.S.C.A.1053, but has less exemp-
tions. 
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DIPO 
Citensfii: 
elated unconstitutional. It was repealed by 
their legislature,5 after a study by the 
Commission on State Government, and ap-
parently largely because of economic con-
siderations. I appreciate that the reason is 
quite immaterial here. But the experience 
itself is in conformity with the idea herein 
advocated: that whatever the problem may 
be, it should be dealt with legislatively 
rather than judicially. 
In accordance with what I have said 
above, it is my judgment that the order of 
forfeiture should be entered as prescribed 
by law. ( All emphasis added.) 
RLLKTT, J., concurs in the dissenting 
opinion of CROCKKTT, J. 
:
 MY NuM6f« SiS 7 
David Lawrence DIPO. Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v, 
Doris D, DIPO and Gcorgo L. Dlpo, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 13490. 
Supreme Court of I'tnli. 
Sept: 10, 1<>74. 
Beneficiary of trust sought to enjoin 
trustees from using portion of trust estate 
to purchase stock in certain corporations 
which had been owned or controlled by set-
tlor and his wife, one of the trustees. The 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Jay \i. Banks, J., dismissed the complaint 
and the beneficiary appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Callister, C. J., held that pro-
posed purchase of assets was authorized by 
trust agreement, which authorized trustees 
to purchase assets of settlor's estate- and 
which provided that propriety of purchase, 
amount of assets purchased and ascertain-
•j 
v. DIPO " Utah 9 2 3 
L'«i i\2d ra 
ment of fair value would be solely within 
discretion of trustees, and that trial co.urt 
properly adopted value placed upon stock 
by trustees and accountant. 
Affirmed. 
1. Trusts C=>2I7.4 
Trust agreement, which authorized 
trustees to purchase assets of settlor's es-
tate at fair value and provided that proprie-
ty of purchase, amount of assets purchased 
ami ascertainment of fair value would be 
solely within discretion of trustees, autho-
rized trustees to use portion of trust estate 
to purchase stock in certain corporations 
which had been owned and controlled by 
settlor and his wife. U.C.A.1953, 33^2-1, 
33-2-2. 
2. Trusts C=>2I7.3(5) 
Terms of trust, unless illegal or 
against public policy, govern over such 
statutes as the "prudent man" statute with 
regard to investment of trust funds. U.C. 
A.l<>?3, 33-2-2. 
3. Trusts 0 2 6 2 
Testimony of settlor's insurance advis-
er that one of the main purposes of set-
tlor's purchase of life policies and creation 
of trust by settlor was to enable settlor's 
estate to pay inheritance taxes without ne-
cessity of liquidating corporations was not 
inadmissible on ground that it was hearsay 
in action to enjoin trustees, following 
death of settlor, from using trust estate de-
rived from life policies to purchase stock 
in corporations which had been owned or 
controlled by settlor and his wife. 
4. Trusts C=>263 
In action instituted by beneficiary of 
trust to enjoin trustees from using portion 
of trust estate to purchase-stock in corpo-
rations which had been owned or con-
trolled by settlor and his wife, trial court 
properly adopted value which had been 
placed upon the stock by trustees and ac-
countant who did not take into considera-
tion claimed discount in value dvx to fact 
that stock was closely held. 
5. California Statutes 11)07, Ch. 2S<J. See. 3, p. 1438. 
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John T. Caine of 
PICIIAPDS, CAINE &. RICHARDS 
Attorney for Joe -Arave 
2 5'"^  Washington Boulevard 
Ogdon, Utah'844 01 
Telephone: 399-4191 
IN ':\\Y. DISTRICT C0U>T 
COUNTY Or CACHE, STATE OF UTA-i 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. : Civil No. 23241-
1983 PONTIAC, : 
Defendant." : . ' - . ' ! 
This matter having come on for trial before the Honorable 
VeNcy Christoffersen on February 8, 1985. The plaintiff was \ 
i 
represented by Deputy Cache County Attorney, James Jenkins, and I 
the owner of the 198 3 Pontiac, Joe Arave, was present and \ 
represented by his attorney, John T. Caine, and the court having j 
heard the testimony of the witnesses and being fully advised in : 
the premise, now makes the following findings of fact and 
conclusions of law: I 
FINDINGS OF FACT ; 
1. That Joe Arave i-s the owner of a 1983 black Pontiac 
Firebird, serial number 1G2A587H7DL213190, and the value of said j 
automobile is approximately $10,000. 
2. That the automobile was used by the owner, Joe Arave, 
who, on two different occasions, utilized the vehicle for .the 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
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transportation of a small quantity of cocaine". <:,,Vthough ther^ :.*• 
no evidence that any profit motive-was -'involved end it is. 
questionable whether the cocaine was for sale- or merely •-": 
possession for his own use and- for the use of someone he thought 
was his friend. 
3. That there was no perfected security interest in the 
vehicle but the vehicle had been rebuilt utilizing money loaned 
from Zionfs Bank pursuant to a loan agreement that required his 
father's guarantee. This was an arrangement that had been in 
effect for two and one-half years. Arave had been in the 
business of buying cars and fixing them for resale and this was 
the procedure he utilized to secure vehicles which he would then 
resale and pay off the bank loans. If the car is forfeited, the 
person who is penalized would not be the defendant, Arave, but 
either the bank or his father. 
4. That the value of the vehicle, if forfeited to the 
state, is disproportionate to the use of the vehicle for the. 
transportation of a controlled substance. 
5. That the state filed it's complaint for forfeiture on 
September 20, 1984, and an answer was filed on October 18, 1984. i 
I 
The matter was not set for a hearing until February 8, 1985, 
which exceeded the twenty day requirement of §58-36-13,, Utah Code 
-Annotated (1553). 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW . 
1. From the foregoing findings of fact, and considering the 
totality of all the circumstances, the court concludes that the 
above described vehicle should net be forfeited to the state 
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pursuant to §58-37-13 Utah Code Annotated (1953, an tender" ' , 
2. That the 1983 Pontiac Firebird is to be inimrsdic-.tul'-. 
returned to Joe ;-.rave, the registered owner. That 3.f v.lv: i-ta*1.-.-
chooses to appeal this order, that Arave will maintain c^ T 1 is.i r-r. 
insurance on said vehicle in an amount of $10,000 and will ru.•-
sell, encumber, trade, or in any other way hypothecate iJ- o«-r:.ng 
the pendency of said appeal unless by order of the court;. 
DATED this day of February, 1935. 
BY THE COURT: 
VeMOY CHRISTOFFERSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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John T. Caine of 
R^HARDS, CAINE & RICHARDS 
7r-:_orney for Joe Arave 
?5oQ Washington Boulevard 
Ogaen, Ital "'#4 4 01 
Tivlef hone: 3 9 9-4191 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF U, > •: 
ST-TL OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
vs . 
198 3 PONTIAC, 
Defendant, 
ORDER 
Civil No. 23241 
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This matter having come on for trial before the Honorable 
VeNoy Christoffersen on February 8, 1985. The plaintiff was 
represented by Deputy Cache County Attorney, James Jenkins, and 
the owner of the 1983 Pontiac, Joe Arave, was present and 
represented by his attorney, John T. Caine, and the court having 
heard the testimony of the witnesses and being fully advised in 
the premise, and the court having heretofore entered its findings 
of fact and conclusions of law, now enters the following order; 
1. That the complaint for forfeiture to the state be and is 
hereby dismissed. 
2. That the 1983 Pontiac Firebird, serial number 
IG2A587H7DL213190, be forthwith returned to the registered owner, 
Joe Arave. That if the state chooses to appeal this order, that 
Arave will maintain collision insurance on said vehicle in an 
amount of $10,000 and will not sell, encumber, trade, or in any 
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.other .way hypothecate it during the pendency 
unless by order of the court, 
DATED this _____ day of February, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
:\. : n rv H* 
VeNOY CHRISTOFFERSON 
DISTRICT COURT JliDGE 
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